Defending Water Treatment Networks: Exploiting Spatio-temporal Effects
  for Cyber Attack Detection by Wang, Dongjie et al.
Defending Water Treatment Networks: Exploiting
Spatio-temporal Effects for Cyber Attack Detection
1st Dongjie Wang
Department of Computer Science
University of Central Florida
Orlando,United States
wangdongjie@knights.ucf.edu
2nd Pengyang Wang
Department of Computer Science
University of Central Florida
Orlando, United States
pengyang.wang@knights.ucf.edu
3rd Jingbo Zhou
Baidu Research
Baidu Inc.
Beijing, China
zhoujingbo@baidu.com
4th Leilei Sun
Department of Computer Science
Beihang University
Beijing, China
leileisun@buaa.edu.cn
5th Bowen Du
Department of Computer Science
Beihang University
Beijing, China
dubowen@gmail.com
6th Yanjie Fu†
Department of Computer Science
University of Central Florida
Orlando, United States
yanjie.fu@ucf.edu
Abstract—While Water Treatment Networks (WTNs) are crit-
ical infrastructures for local communities and public health,
WTNs are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Effective detection of
attacks can defend WTNs against discharging contaminated
water, denying access, destroying equipment, and causing public
fear. While there are extensive studies in WTNs attack detection,
they only exploit the data characteristics partially to detect cyber
attacks. After preliminary exploring the sensing data of WTNs,
we find that integrating spatio-temporal knowledge, represen-
tation learning, and detection algorithms can improve attack
detection accuracy. To this end, we propose a structured anomaly
detection framework to defend WTNs by modeling the spatio-
temporal characteristics of cyber attacks in WTNs. In particular,
we propose a spatio-temporal representation framework specially
tailored to cyber attacks after separating the sensing data of
WTNs into a sequence of time segments. This framework has two
key components. The first component is a temporal embedding
module to preserve temporal patterns within a time segment
by projecting the time segment of a sensor into a temporal
embedding vector. We then construct Spatio-Temporal Graphs
(STGs), where a node is a sensor and an attribute is the temporal
embedding vector of the sensor, to describe the state of the
WTNs. The second component is a spatial embedding module,
which learns the final fused embedding of the WTNs from STGs.
In addition, we devise an improved one class-SVM model that
utilizes a new designed pairwise kernel to detect cyber attacks.
The devised pairwise kernel augments the distance between
normal and attack patterns in the fused embedding space. Finally,
we conducted extensive experimental evaluations with real-world
data to demonstrate the effectivness of our framework: it achieves
an accuracy of 91.65%, with average improvement ratios of
82.78% and 22.96% with respect to F1 and AUC, compared
with baseline methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
Water Treatment Networks (WTNs) are critical infras-
tructures that utilize industrial control systems, sensors and
communication technologies to control the water purification
processes to improve the water quality and distribution for
drinking, irrigation, or industrial uses. Although it is a critical
infrastructure, WTNs are vulnerable to cyber attacks. For
example, the water sector reported the fourth largest number
of incidents in 2016 1. How does a cyber attack to WTNs
look like? Figure 1 shows that a water treatment procedure
includes six stages (i.e., P1-P6), each of which is monitored
by sensors; a cyber attack compromises the RO Feed Pump
sensor of P4 to change the levels of chemicals being used to
treat tap water. As a result, there is a compelling need for an
effective solution to attack detection in WTNs.
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Fig. 1. Cyber attack example: one cyber attack happens at RO Feed Pump
of P4, then the cyber attack effect spreads to other devices in P4.
In the literature, there are a number of studies about cyber
attack detection in WTNs [1]–[4]. However, most of these
studies only exploit traditional spaiotemporal data prepro-
cessing and pattern extraction methods to distinguish attack
patterns. Our preliminary explorations find that tremendous
opportunities exist in solving the problem by teaching a
machine to augment the differences between normal and attack
patterns. To this end, in this paper, we aim to effectively solve
1https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1372266
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the attack detection problem by augmenting the difference
between normal and attack patterns in WTNs.
However, it is challenging to mine the spatio-temporal
graph stream data of WTNs and identify the strategy to
maximize the pattern divergence between normal and attack
behaviors. By carefully examining the sensing data of WTNs,
we identify three types of characteristics of cyber attacks:
(1) delayed effect, meaning that many attacks will not take
effects immediately, but usually exhibit symptoms after a
while; (2) continued effect, meaning that the effects of attacks
will sustain for a while, not disappear rapidly; (3) cascading
effect, meaning that the effects of attacks propagate to other
sensors across the whole WTNs. Specifically, the delayed and
continued effects are both temporal, and the cascading effect
is spatial. More importantly, these three effects are mutually
coupled, impacted, and boosted in WTNs. A new framework is
required to address the margin maximization between normal
and attack pattern learning, under the three coupled effects.
Along this line, we propose a structured detection frame-
work. This framework has two main phases: (1) spatio-
temporal representation learning, which includes two modules:
incorporating temporal effects and spatial effects; (2) improved
unsupervised one-class detection, which utilizes a new de-
signed pairwise kernel to make detection more accurate. Next,
we briefly introduce our structured spatio-temporal detection
framework named STDO.
Phase 1: Spatio-temporal representation learning. This
phase aims to learn a good spatio-temporal representation
over the sensing data of WTNs with two modules. The
first module of this part is to integrate temporal effects.
Cyber attacks in WTNs exhibit temporally-dependent attack
behaviors, sequentially-varying attack purposes over time, and
delayed negative impacts. Traditional methods ( e.g., AR, MA,
ARMA, ARIMA, arrival density of point process, change
point detection) mostly model the patterns of data points
at each timestamp. However, we identify that partitioning
the sensing data into a sequence of time segments can help
to better describe delayed and continued effect of attacks.
Therefore, we propose to segment the sensing data into a
sequence of time segments. We then exploit a sequence-to-
sequence (seq2seq) embedding method to characterize the
temporal dependencies within each time segment. To improve
the seq2seq method, we develop a new neural reconstruction
structure to reconstruct not just a time segment, but also first
and second derivatives of momentum of the time segment. In
this way, the improved seq2seq method can have the awareness
of values, acceleration, and jerk (second order derivatives) of
sensor measurements. Through this module, we obtain the
temporal embedding of each time segment of each sensor.
The second module is to integrate spatial effects. The
effects of cyber attacks in WTNs will spatially diffuse and
propagate to other sensors over time. Therefore, exploring the
propagation structure can significantly model attack patterns
and improve detection accuracy. However, how can we capture
the spatial structures of propagation? The topology of WTNs
is a graph of interconnected sensors. We map the temporal
embedding of one time segment of a sensor to the graph of
WTNs as node attributes. We construct the Spatio-Temporal
Graphs (STGs), where a node is a sensor and an attribute is the
temporal embedding of the sensor, to describe the state of the
WTNs. In this way, the STGs not only contain spatial con-
nectivity among different sensors, but also include temporal
patterns by mapping temporal embedding. We develop graph
embedding model to jointly learn the state representations of
the WTNs from the relational STGs.
Phase 2: Improving Unsupervised One-Class Detection
Model. In reality, WTNs are mostly normal yet with a small
number of cyber attack events, so the attack data samples are
quite rare. This trait makes the data distributions of normal
and attack extremely imbalanced. How can we overcome the
imbalanced data distribution to accurately detect cyber attack?
One-class detection fits well this problem. In particular, one-
class SVM (OC-SVM) is a popular detection model, in which
a hyper-plane is identified to divide normal and abnormal data
samples after being mapped to a high-dimmensional space by
kernel functions. While vanilla OC-SVM achieves promising
results, the kernel functions can be improved by exploiting the
similarities between data samples. Specifically, we propose a
new pair-wise kernel function to augment the distance between
normal and attack patterns by preserving similarity across
different data samples. Consequently, normal data samples are
grouped into a cluster, while abnormal data samples are pushed
away from normal data. In our framework, we feed the learned
state representations of the WTN into the improved OC-SVM
to use the pairwise kernel to detect attacks.
In summary, we develop a structured detection framework
for cyber attack detection in WTNs. Our contributions are as
follows: (1) we investigate an important problem of defend-
ing critical graph-structured infrastructures via cyber attack
detection, which is important for building resilient and safe
communities. (2) we develop a structured detection framework
to maximize the margin between normal and attack patterns,
by integrating spatio-temporal knowledge, deep representation
learning, and pairwise one-class detection. (3) we implement
and test our proposed framework with real-world water treat-
ment network data and demonstrate the enhanced performance
of our method. Specifically, our detection method achieves
an accuracy of 91.65%, with average improvement ratios of
82.78% and 22.96% with respect to F1 and AUC, compared
with baseline methods.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND FRAMEWORK OVERVIEW
We first introduce the statement of the problem, and then
present an overview of the framework.
A. Problem Statement
We aim to study the problem of cyber attack detection using
the sensing data of WTNs. We observe that cyberattacks in
WTNs exhibit not just spatial diffusion patterns, but also two
temporal effects (i.e., delayed and continued). As a result, we
partition the sensing data streams into non-overlapped time
segments. We investigate detection on the time segment level.
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Fig. 2. The overview of cyber attack detection framework in water treatment network
Definition 2.1: The WTN Attack Detection Problem. For-
mally, assuming a WTN consists of N sensors, given the
sensing data streams of a WTN, we evenly divide the
streams into m non-overlapped segments by every K sen-
sory records. Consequently, we obtain a segment sequence
S = [S1,S2, · · · ,Si, · · · ,Sm], where the matrix Si ∈ RN×K
is the i-th segment. Each segment is associated with a cyber
attack status label: if a cyber attack happens within Si, the
label of this segment is marked as yi = 1; Otherwise, yi = 0.
The objective is to develop a framework that takes the segment
sequence S as inputs, and output the corresponding cyber
attack labels for each segment to maximize detection accuracy.
B. Framework Overview
Figure 2 shows that our framework includes two phases:
(1) Spatio-temporal representation learning (P1); (2) Improv-
ing unsupervised one-class detection (P2). Specifically, there
are two modules in Phase 1: (a) Embedding time segment
sequential patterns, in which a seq2seq model is leveraged to
capture the temporal dependencies within a segment. Later,
the learned representations are attached to each node (sensor)
in the WTNs as node attributes to construct STGs. Be sure
to notice that temporal patterns are integrated by attaching
temporal embeddings as attributes; and spatial connectivity is
integrated via a graph structure of sensors, which is introduced
next. (b) Modeling spatio-temporal patterns over STGs, in
which the fused embedding is learned through an encode-
decode paradigm integrated with Graph Convolutional Net-
work (GCN). The fused embedding summarizes the informa-
tion of STGs to profile the spatio-temporal characteristics in
WTNs. Finally, the Phase 2 exploit the fused embedding as
inputs to detect attacks. The Phase 2 has one module, namely
anomaly detection with pairwise segment similarity awareness.
Specifically, the fused embedding is fed into an improved one-
class anomaly detector integrated with awareness of pairwise
segment similarity. Specifically, the similarities between two
different segment embedding vectors are introduced to the
pairwise kernel of the detector to augment the distance be-
tween normal and attack patterns.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
We first introduce time segment embedding, then illustrate
the construction of spatio-temporal graphs using temporal em-
bedding and sensor networks, present spatio-temporal graph-
based representation learning, and, finally, discuss the integra-
tion with one-class detection.
A. Embedding Time Segments Sequential Patterns
We first model the sequential patterns of time segments.
The sequential patterns of WTN involves two essential mea-
surements: (1) changing rate and (2) the trend of changing
rate, which correspond to the first and second derivatives
respectively. Therefore, in addition to the raw data points in
one segment, we introduce both the first and second derivatives
to quantify the sequential patterns, resulting in an augmented
segment. Formally, blow we define the augmented segment.
Definition 3.1: Augmented Segment. Given a sensory data
segment denoted by Si = [v1i ,v
2
i , · · · ,vki , · · · ,vKi ], where
vki ∈ RN×1 denotes the sensory measurements of all the
sensors of the i-th segment at the k-th record. Then, the
corresponding first-order derivative segment S
′
i is S
′
i =
[ ∂Si
∂v2i
, ∂Si
∂v3i
, · · · , ∂Si
∂vKi
], and the corresponding second-order
derivative segment S
′′
i is S
′′
i = [
∂S
′
i
∂v3i
,
∂S
′
i
∂v4i
, · · · , ∂S
′
∂vKi
]. The
augmented segment S˜i is then defined as the concatenation of
the raw segment, the first-order derivative segments, and the
second-order derivative segments: S˜i = [Si,S
′
i,S
′′
i ]. For con-
venience, S˜i also can be denoted as S˜i = [r1i , r
2
i , . . . , r
3K−3
i ],
where elements in [r1i , r
2
i , · · · , rKi ] corresponds to each el-
ement in Si, elements in [rK+1i , r
K+2
i , · · · , r2K−1i ] cor-
responds to each element in S
′
i, and the elements in
[r2Ki , r
2K+1
i , · · · , r3K−3i ] corresponds to each element in S
′′
i
respectively.
We here provide an example of constructing an augmented
segment. Suppose there are two sensors in WTNs, there are
three measurement records in each time segment. In such
WTN, N is 2 and K is 3. Considering the i-th segment
Si = [[1, 3, 4], [2, 8, 5]], the size of Si is 2 × 3. We then
calculate the S
′
i by row: S
′
i = [[2, 1], [6,−3]]. Afterward,
S
′′
i = [[−1], [−9]]. Finally, we concatenate these three seg-
ments by row: S˜i = [[1, 3, 4, 2, 1,−1][2, 8, 5, 6,−3,−9]].
Figure 2(a) shows the process of temporal embedding. The
temporal embedding process develops a seq2seq model based
on the encoder-decoder paradigm that takes a non-augmented
segment as inputs, and reconstructs the corresponding aug-
mented segment. The objective is to minimize the loss between
the original augmented segment and the reconstructed one.
Next, we provide an example about how our model operate
the i-th segment Si.
The encoding step feeds the segment Si into a seq2seq
encoder, and outputs the latent representation of the segment
Ui. Formally, as shown in Equation 1, given the segment data
Si = [v
1
i ,v
2
i , . . . ,v
K
i ], the first hidden state h
1 is calculated
by the first time step value. Then recursively, the hidden state
of the previous time step ht−1 and the current time step value
vti are fed into a LSTM model to produce the current time
step hidden state ht. Finally, we concatenate all of the hidden
states by row (sensor) to obtain the latent feature matrix Ui. h
1 = σ(Wev
1
i + be),
ht = LSTM([vti ,h
t−1]),∀t ∈ {2, . . . ,K},
Ui = CONCAT (h
1,h2, . . . ,hK),
(1)
where We and be are the weight and bias of the encoding
step, respectively.
In the decoding step, the decoder takes Ui as in-
puts and generates a reconstructed augmented segment:
[ˆr1i , rˆ
2
i , . . . , rˆ
3K−3
i ]. Formally, as shown in Equation 2, the first
hidden state hˆ1 of the decoder is copied from the last hidden
state of encoder hK . Then, the previous time step hidden
state hˆt−1, the previous time step element rˆt−1i , and the latent
feature vector Ui are input into the LSTM model to produce
the current time step hidden state hˆt. Finally, the reconstructed
value of current time step rˆti is produced by current hidden
state hˆt that is activated by sigmoid function σ.
hˆ1 = hK ,
rˆ1i = σ(Wdhˆ
1 + bd),
hˆt = LSTM([rˆt−1i , hˆ
t−1,Ui]),∀t ∈ {2, . . . ,K},
rˆti = σ(Wdhˆ
t + bd),∀t ∈ {2, . . . ,K},
(2)
where Wd and bd are the weight and bias for the decoding
step respectively.
After the decoding step, we obtain the reconstructed aug-
mented segment sequence [rˆ1i , rˆ
2
i , . . . , rˆ
3K−3
i ]. The objective
is to minimize the reconstruction loss between the original and
reconstructed augmented segment sequence. The overall loss
is denoted as
min
m∑
i=1
3K−3∑
k=1
||rki − rˆki ||2. (3)
Along this line, we obtain the latent temporal embedding at
the i-th time segment, denoted by Ui.
B. Temporal Embedding as Node Attributes: Constructing
Spatio-temporal Graphs
Water
Treatment
Networks Gi
U
i
Fig. 3. The illustration of constructing spatio-temporal graphs.
The temporal embedding, obtained by Section III-A, de-
scribes and models the temporal effects of cyber attacks.
Then, to further incorporate the spatial effects of WTNs, we
map the temporal embedding to WTNs as node attributes.
Taking the temporal embedding of the i-th segment Ui as
an example. Since each row of Ui is a temporal embedding
of a segment of one senor (node), we mapped each row of Ui
to the corresponding node (sensor) as attributes, resulting in an
attributed WTNs Gi, which we call a Spatio-temporal Graph
(STG) that preserves both the spatial and temporal effects.
C. Learning Representations of STGs
Figure 2(b) shows that we develop a spatiotemporal graph
representation learning framework to preserve not just tem-
poral patterns, but also spatial patterns in a latent embedding
space. We take the STG of the i-th time segment, Gi, as an
example to explain the representation process. Formally, we
denote Gi by Gi = (Ui,Ai), where Ai is an adjacency matrix
that describes the connectivity among different sensors; Ui is
a feature matrix that is formed by the temporal embedding of
all the sensors of the i-th time segment. The representation
learning process is formulated as: given the i-th STG Gi, the
objective is to minimize the reconstruction loss between the
input Gi and the reconstructed graph Gˆi, by an encoding-
decoding framework, in order to learn a latent embedding zi.
The neural architecture of the encoder includes two Graph
Convolutional Network (GCN) layers. The first GCN layer
take Ai and Ui as inputs, and then outputs the lower-
dimensional feature matrix Uˆi. Specifically, the encoding
process of the first GCN layer is given by:
Uˆi = RELU(GCN(Ui,Ai))
= RELU(Dˆ
− 12
i AiDˆ
− 12
i UiW0)
(4)
where Dˆi is the diagonal degree matrix of Gi, and W0 is the
weight matrix of the first GCN layer.
Since the latent embedding zi of the graph is sampled from
one prior normal distribution, here the purpose of the second
GCN layer is to assess the parameters of the prior distribution.
This layer takes Ai and Uˆi as the input, then produces the
mean value µ and the variance value δ2 of the prior normal
distribution as the output. Thus the encoding process of the
second GCN layer can be formulated as
µ, log(δ2) = GCN(Uˆi,Ai) = Dˆ
− 12
i AiDˆ
− 12
i UˆiW1, (5)
where W1 is the weight matrix of the second GCN layer. Then
we utilize the reparameterization trick to mimic the sample
operation to construct the latent representation zi. The process
is formulated as
zi = µ+ δ × , (6)
where  ∼ N (0, 1).
The decoding step takes the latent representation zi as the
input and outputs the the reconstructed adjacent matrix Aˆi.
The decoding process is denoted as
Aˆi = σ(ziz
T
i ). (7)
In addition, the core calculation of the decoding step can
be denoted as zizTi = ‖zi‖
∥∥zTi ∥∥ cos θ. Owing to the zi is
the node level representation, the inner product calculation is
helpful to capture the correlation among different sensors.
We minimize the joint loss function Lg during the training
phase, which is formulated as Equation 8. Lg includes two
parts. The first part is Kullback-Leibler divergence between
the distribution of zi and the prior standard normal distribution
denoted by N (0, 1). The second part is the squared error
between Ai and Aˆi. Our training purpose is to make the Aˆi
as similar as Ai, and to let the distribution of zi as close as
N (0, 1). The total loss is denoted as
Lg =
m∑
i=1
KL[q(zi|Xi,Ai)||p(zi)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
KL Divergence between q(.) and p(.)
+
Loss between Ai and Aˆi︷ ︸︸ ︷
w∑
j=1
∥∥∥Ai − Aˆi∥∥∥2
(8)
When the model converges, we apply the global average
aggregation to zi. Then the zi becomes the graph-level rep-
resentation of the WTNs, which contains the spatio-temporal
information of the whole system at i-th time segment.
D. One-Class Detection with Data Similarity Awareness
In reality, most of sensor data are normal, and attacks related
data are scarce and expensive. This indeed results into the
problem of unbalanced training data. How can we solve the
problem? Can we develop a solution that only uses normal
data for attack detection? This is the key algorithm challenge
for this phase. One-class classification is a promising solution
that aims to find a hyperplane to distinguish normal and attack
patterns only using normal data. Specifically, OC-SVM is
a classical one-class classification model. OC-SVM includes
two steps: (1) mapping low dimensional data into a high
dimensional feature space by a kernel function. (2) learning
the parameters of hyper-plane to divide normal and abnormal
data via optimization.
Intuitively, in the hyperspace provided by OC-SVM, the
normal (or abnormal) data are expected to be closer, while
there should be a large distance between normal and abnormal
data. In other words, similar data points should be closer
to each other than dissimilar ones. However, traditional ker-
nel functions (e.g., linear, nonlinear, polynomial, radial basis
function (RBF), sigmoid) cannot preserve such characteristic
well. How can we make data samples well-separated in order
to achieve such characteristic? To address the question, we
propose a new pairwise kernel function that is capable of
reducing the distances between similar data points, while
maximizing the distances between dissimilar ones. Formally,
given the representation matrix Z = [z1, · · · , zi, · · · , zm], the
pairwise kernel function is given by :
Kernel = tanh
(
1
D(Z)ZZ
T + sim(Z,ZT ) + c
)
(9)
where ZT is the transpose of Z, D(Z) is the covariance matrix
of Z, and sim(Z,ZT ) ∈ RN×N is the pairwise similarity
matrix between segments. Compared with the vanilla sigmoid
kernel function, we add sim(Z,ZT ), where the range of
sim(Z,ZT ) is [−1, 1]. If two segments are more similar, the
corresponding value in sim(Z,ZT ) is closer to 1. Otherwise,
the value is closer to −1. Therefore, when two segments
are similar (e.g., both are normal or abnormal samples), the
proposed parwise kernel function will push these two segments
closer; otherwise, these two segments will be set away from
each other.
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Fig. 4. The illustration of pairwise kernel, given normal data x1, owing to
x2 is normal and x3 is attack, sim(x1, x2)>sim(x1, x3) and the directions
of sim(x1, x2) and sim(x1, x3) are opposite. Pairwise kernel increase the
distance between x2 and x3 .
The pairwise kernel is able to enlarge the distance among
different category samples in feature space, which makes the
OC-SVM converge more easily and detect cyber attacks more
accurate. Figure 2(c) shows the detection process of cyber
attacks. The spatio-temporal embedding zi is fed into the
integrated OC-SVM to detect cyber attacks by utilizing the
pairwise kernel function, and to output the corresponding
status labels of WTNs, to indicate whether a cyber attack
happen or not at the i-th time segment.
E. Comparison with Related Work
Recently, lots of attempts have been made to detect cyber
attacks in WTNs. For instance, Lin et al. utilized a proba-
bilistic graphical model to preserve the spatial dependency
among sensors in WTNs and a one-class classifier to detect
cyber attacks [5]. Li et al. regarded the LSTM and RNN
as the basic model of the GAN framework to develop an
anomaly detection algorithm to detect cyber attacks in WTNs
[3]. Raciti et al. constructed one real-time anomaly detection
system based on cluster model [6]. However, these models
exhibit several limitations when detecting cyber attacks: (i)
the changing trend of sensing data in a time segment is not
preserved; (ii) the spatial patterns among sensors are captured
partially; (iii) the similarity between different data samples is
not utilized completely.
In order to overcome these limitations, we propose a new
spatio-temporal graph (STG) to preserve and fuse spatio-
temporal effects of WTNs simultaneously. Moreover, a new
pairwise kernel that utilizing the data similarity to augment the
distance among different patterns is also proposed to improve
the accuracy of cyber attack detection.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We conduct experiments to answer the following research
questions:
(1) Does our proposed outlier detection framework (STOD)
outperforms the existing methods?
(2) Is the spatio-temporal representation learning component
of STOD necessary for improving detection performance?
(3) Is the proposed pairwise kernel better than other traditional
kernels for cyber attack detection?
(4) How much time will our method and other methods cost?
A. Data Description
We used the secure water treatment system (SWAT) data
set that is from Singapore University of Technology and
Design for our study. The SWAT has project built one water
treatment system and a sensor network to monitor and track
the situations of the system. Then, they construct one attack
model to mimic the cyber attack of this kind of system in the
real scenario. The cyber attacks to and the sensory data of the
system are collected to form the SWAT dataset. Table I show
some important statistics of the SWAT dataset. Specifically, the
SWAT dataset include a normal set (no cyber attacks) and an
attack set (with cyber attacks). The time period of the normal
data is from 22 December 2015 to 28 December 2015. The
time period of the attack data is from 28 December 2015 to 01
January 2016, and 01 February 2016. There is no time period
overlap between the normal data and the attack data on 28
January 2015. It is difficult to identify more water treatment
network datasets. In this study, we focus on validating our
method using this dataset.
TABLE I
STATICS OF THE SWAT DATA SET
Data Type Sensor Count Total Items Attack Items Pos/Neg
Normal 51 496800 0 -
Attack 51 449919 53900 7:1
B. Evaluation Metrics
We evaluate the performances of our method in terms of
four metrics. Given a testset, a detection model will predict a
set of binary labels (1: attack; 0: normal). Compared predicted
labels with golden standard benchmark labels, we let tp, tn,
fp, fn be the sizes of the true positive, true negative, false
positive, false negative sets, respectively.
(1) Accuracy: is given by:
Accuracy =
tp+ tn
tp+ tn+ fp+ fn
(10)
(2) Precision: is given by:
Precision =
tp
tp+ fp
(11)
(3) F-measure: is the harmonic mean of precision and recall,
which is given by:
F −measure = 2× Precision×Recall
Precision+Recall
(12)
(4) AUC: is the area under the ROC curve. It shows the
capability of a model to distinguish between two classes.
C. Baseline Algorithms
We compare the performances of our method (STOD)
against the following ten baseline algorithms.
(1) DeepSVDD [7]: expands the classic SVDD algorithm into
a deep learning version. It utilizes a neural network to find
the hyper-sphere of minimum volume that wraps the nor-
mal data. If a data sample falls inside of the hyper-sphere,
DeepSVDD classifies the sample as normal, and attack
otherwise. In the experiments, we set the dimensions of
the spatio-temporal embedding zi to 28× 28.
(2) GANomaly [8]: is based on the GAN framework. It
develop a new version of generator by using the encoder-
decoder-encoder structure. The algorithm regards the dif-
ference between the embedding of the first encoder and
the embedding of the second encoder as the anomaly score
to distinguish normal and abnormal. In the experiments,
we set the dimension of the spatio-temporal embedding
vector zi into 28× 28.
(3) LODA [9]: is an ensemble outlier detection model. It
collects a series of weak anomaly detectors to produce a
strong detector. In addition, the model fits real-time data
flow and is resistant to missing values in the data set. In
the experiments, we fed the learned representations into
the LODA to detect.
(4) Isolation-Forest [10]. The IsolationForest isolates observa-
tions by randomly selecting a feature and then randomly
selecting a split value between the maximum and mini-
mum values of the selected feature. In the experiments, we
input spatio-temporal embedding vector zi into Isolation-
Forest, and set the number of estimators = 100, max
sample numbers = 256.
(5) LOF [11]. The principle of LOF is to measure the local
density of data samples. If one data sample has low local
density, the sample is an outlier. Otherwise, the sample
is a normal sample. In the experiments, we input the
spatio-temporal embedding vector zi into LOF and set
the number of neighborhood = 20, the distance metric for
finding neighborhoods is euclidean distance.
(6) KNN [12]. KNN selects k nearest neighborhoods of one
data sample based on a distance metric. KNN calculates
the anomaly score of the data sample according to the
anomaly situation of the k neighborhoods. In the experi-
ments, we input spatio-temporal embedding vector zi into
KNN, and set the number of neighborhoods = 5, the
adopted distance metric is euclidean distance.
(7) ABOD [13]. The ABOD method uses angle as a more
robust measure to detect outliers. If many neighborhoods
of one sample locate in the same direction to the sample,
it is an outlier, otherwise, it is a normal sample. In the
experiments, we input spatio-temporal embedding zi into
ABOD, set k = 10. The angle metric is cosine value.
(8) STODP1. We proposed to partition the sensing data into
non-overlapped segments. The global mean pooling tech-
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nique was then applied to fuse the segments of different
sensors into an averaged feature vector. We fed the fused
feature vector into OC-SVM for outlier detection. The
kernel of OC-SVM is defined in Equation 9.
(9) STODP2. We applied the global mean pooling to the
temporal embedding vectors generated by Section 3.A to
obtain a global feature vector of WTN, which was fed
into OC-SVM for outlier detection. In addition, the kernel
of OC-SVM is our proposed kernel function defined in
Equation 9.
(10) STODP3. In order to study the effect of Seq2Seq, we
remove the Seq2Seq module of our framework pipeline.
The temporal segments of different sensors are organized
as graph set. The graph set is input into graph embedding
module to obtain the final embedding. Finally, the embed-
ding is input into OC-SVM to do outlier detection. The
kernel of the OC-SVM is defined in Equation 9.
In the experiments, the spatio-temporal representation learn-
ing phase of our framework is used to preserve the spatio-
temporal patterns and data characteristics into feature learning.
The one-class outlier detection phase of our framework is
used to detect the cyber attack status of the water treatment
system based on the spatio-temporal representation. We only
use normal data to train our model. After the training phase,
our model has the capability to detect the status of the testing
data set that contains both normal and attack data. All the
evaluations are performed on a x64 machine with Intel i9-
9920X 3.50GHz CPU and 128GB RAM. The operating system
is Ubuntu 18.04.
D. Overall Performances
We compare our method with the baseline models in terms
of accuracy, precision, f-measure and AUC. Figure 5 shows
the average performances of our mtehod (STOD) is the best
in terms of accuracy, f-measure and AUC; our method ranks
second in terms of precision, compared with other baseline
models. A potential interpretation of such observation is that
the STOD captures the temporal effects (delayed , continued)
and spatial effect (cascading) of cyber attacks by spatio-
temporal representation learning part of STOD in a balanced
way. With STOD captures more intrinsic features of cyber
attacks, the model not only finds more attack samples but
also makes fewer mistakes on normal samples. Thus, the
distinguishing ability of STOD is improved greatly. But on
a single evaluation metric, STOD maybe poorer than other
baselines. Overall, STOD outperforms with respect to Accu-
racy, F-measure and ACU compared with baseline models,
which signifies our detection framework owns the best attack
detection ability.
Another observation is that the performances of LOF,
ABOD, and KNN are much worse than other models. The
possible reason is that these models exploit distance or angle-
based assessment strategies. These geometrical measurements
are vulnerable after projecting data into high dimensional
space due to the “curse of dimensionality”. Thus, these models
can not achieve excellent performances.
E. Study of Representation Learning
The representation learning phase of our framework in-
clude: (1) partitioning sensor data streams into segments;
(2) modeling the temporal dependencies with seq2seq; (3)
modeling the spatial dependencies with graph embedding.
What role does each of the three steps play in our framework?
We will iteratively remove each of the three steps to obtain
three different variants, namely STODP1, STODP2, STODP3.
We then test compare the three variants with our original
framework to examine the importance of the removed step
for improving detection performances
Figure 6 shows the experimental results of STOD, STODP1,
STODP2, and STODP3, which clearly show that STOD out-
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Fig. 7. Comparison of different kernels with respect to Accuracy, Precision, F-measure , and AUC.
performs STODP1, STODP2, and STODP3 in terms of accu-
racy, precision, f-measure, and AUC with a large margin. A
reasonable explanation of this phenomenon is that attack pat-
terns are spatially and temporally structured, and, thus, when
more buried spatio-temporal patterns are modeled, the method
becomes more discriminant. The results validate the three steps
(segmentation, temporal, spatial) of the representation learning
phase is critical for attack pattern characterization.
F. Study of Pairwise Kernel Function
The kernel function is vital for the SVM based algorithm
family. An effective kernel function can map challenging data
samples into a high-dimensional space, and make these data
samples more separable in the task of detection. We design
experiments to validate the improved performances of our
pairwise kernel function by comparing our pairwise kernel
function with other baseline kernel functions. Specifically, the
baseline kernels are as follows:
(1) linear. This kernel is a linear function. There are limited
number of parameters in the linear kernel, so the calcula-
tion process is quick. The dimension of the new feature
space is similar to the original space.
(2) poly. This kernel is a polynomial function. The parameters
of the kernel are more than the linear kernel. It maps data
samples into high dimensional space.
(3) rbf. This kernel is a Gaussian function that is a non-
linear function. It exhibits excellent performance in many
common situations.
(4) sigmoid. This kernel is a sigmoid function. When SVM
utilizing this function to model data samples, the effect is
similar to using a multi-layer perceptron.
Figure 7 shows a comparison between our kernel and
other baseline kernels with respect to all evaluation metrics.
We observed that our kernel shows significant improvement,
compared with other baseline kernels, in terms of Accuracy,
Precision, F-measure, and AUC, This indicates that our kernel
can effectively augment the attack patterns in original data, and
maximize the difference between normal and attack patterns,
by mapping original data samples into high dimensional
feature space. This experiment validates the superiority of our
pairwise kernel function.
G. Study of Time Costs
We aim to study the time costs of training and testing in
different models. Specifically, we divided the dataset into six
non-overlap folds. We then used cross-validation to evaluate
the time costs of different models.
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Figure 8 shows the comparison of training time costs
among different models. We find that the training time costs
of each model is relatively stable. An obvious observation
is GANomaly has the largest training time cost than other
models. This is because the encoder-decoder-encoder network
architecture design is time-consuming. In addition, the training
time of STOD is slightly longer than OC-SVM. This can be
explained by the fact that the similarity calculation of pairwise
kernel function increases time costs, since we need to calculate
the similarities between two representation vectors of each
training data sample.
The Index of Folds
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Figure 9 shows the comparisons of testing time costs among
different models. The testing time costs of each model are
relatively stable as well. And many of them can complete the
testing task within one second, except GANomaly. We find the
testing time of our method is shorter than the training time by
comparing Figure 8 and Figure 9. This can be explained by a
strategy of our method: once the model training is completed,
our method stores the kernel mapping parameters in order to
save time of computation. In addition, GANomaly still shows
the largest testing time cost. The reason is that the testing
phase of GANomaly needs to calculate two representation
vectors of each testing data samples, and, thus, GANomaly
doesn’t use less time, compared with that of the training phase.
H. Case Study: Visualization for Spatio-temporal Embedding
The spatio-temporal representation learning phase is an
important step in our structured detection framework. An
effective representation learning method should be able to
preserve the patterns of normal or attack behaviors and
maximize the distances between normal and attack in the
detection task. We visualize the spatio-temporal embedding on
a 2-dimensional space, in order to validate the discriminant
capabilities of our learned representations. Specifically, we
first select 3000 normal and 3000 attack spatio-temporal
embedding respectively. We then utilize the T-SNE manifold
method to visualize the embedding. Figure 10 shows the
visualization results of normal and attack data samples. We
find that our representation learning result is discriminant in a
transformed 2-dimensional space. As can be seen, the learned
normal and attack representation vectors are clustered together
to form dense areas. The observation shows that non-linear
models are more appropriate for distinguishing normal and
attack behaviors than linear methods.
Fig. 10. visualization result for spatio-temporal embedding
V. RELATED WORK
Representation Learning. Representation learning is to
learn a low-dimensional vector to represent the given data
of an object. Representation learning approaches are three-
fold: (1) probabilistic graphical models; (2) manifold learning
approaches; (3) auto-encoder and its variants; The main idea
of the probabilistic graphical model is to learn an uncertain
knowledge representation by a Bayesian network [14], [15].
The key challenge of such methods is to find the topology rela-
tionship among nodes in the probabilistic graphical model. The
manifold learning methods utilize the non-parametric approach
to find manifold and embedding vectors in low dimensional
space based on neighborhood information [16], [17]. However,
manifold learning is usually time-costly. The discriminative
ability of such methods is very high in many applications.
Recently, deep learning models are introduced to conduct
representation learning. The auto-encoder model is a classi-
cal neural network framework, which embeds the non-linear
relationship in feature space via minimizing the reconstruction
loss between original and reconstructed data [18]–[20]. When
representation learning meets spatial data, autoencoders can
inetgrate with spatio-temporal statistical correlations to learn
more effective embedding vectors. [21]–[23]. For instance,
Singh et al, use the auto-encoder framework to learn the
spatio-temporal representation of traffic videos to help detect
the road accidents [24]. Wang et al. utilize spatio-temporal
representation learning to learn the intrinsic feature of GPS
trajectory data to help analyze driving behavior [25].
Deep Outlier Detection. Outlier detection is a classical
problem with important applications, such as, fraud detection
and cyber attack detection. Recently, deep learning has been
introduced into outlier detection. According to the availability
of outlier labels, deep anomaly detection can be classified
into three categories: (1) supervised deep outlier detection;
(2) semi-supervised deep outlier detection; (3) unsupervised
deep outlier detection. First, supervised deep outlier detection
models usually train a deep classification model to distinguish
whether a data sample is normal or not [26], [27]. These
models are not widely available in reality, because it is difficult
to obtain data labels of outliers. Meanwhile, data imbalance is
a serious issue that degrades the performances of supervised
models. Second, semi-supervised outlier detection methods
usually train a deep auto-encoder model to learn the latent em-
bedding of normal data [28]–[30], then the learned embedding
vectors are used to accomplish outlier detection task. In deep
semi-supervised outlier detection, one-class classification is an
important research direction. For instance, Liu et. al, proposed
to detect the anomaly data on uncertain data by SVDD algo-
rithm [31]. Many experiments have shown the adaptability of
one class SVM. Third, unsupervised outlier detection models
do not need any label information, they detect outliers depends
on the intrinsic rules (e.g., scores, distance, similarity) of
data [32]–[34]. Such methods are appropriate for scenarios
that are hard to collect label information.
Cyber Attack Detection in Water Treatment Network.
Water purification plants are critical infrastructures in our local
communities. Such infrastructures are usually vulnerable to
cyber attacks. Early detection of cyber attacks in water treat-
ment networks is significant for defending our infrastructure
safety and public health. There are many existing studies
about outlier detection in water treatment networks [2], [4],
[5], [35], [36]. For instance, Adepu et al. studied the impact
of cyber attacks on water distribution systems [37]. Goh et
al. designed an unsupervised learning approach that regards
Recurrent Neural Networks as a temporal predictor to detect
attacks [1]. Inoue et al. compared the performances of Deep
Neural Network and OC-SVM on outlier detection in water
treatment networks [38]. Raciti et al. developed a real-time
outlier detection system by clustering algorithms and deployed
the system into a water treatment network [6]. However, there
is limited studies that integrate deep graph representation
learning, spatiotemporal patterns, and one-class detection to
more effectively address cyber attack problems.
VI. CONCLUSION REMARKS
We studied the problem of cyber attack detection in water
treatment networks. To this end, we proposed a structured
detection framework to integrate spatial-temporal patterns,
deep representation learning, and one-class detection. Specif-
ically, we first partitioned the sensing data of WTNs into a
sequence of fixed-size time segments. We then built a deep
spaiotemporal representation learning approach to preserve the
spatio-temporal patterns of attacks and normal behaviors. The
representation learning approach includes two modules: (1)
a temporal embedding module, which preserves the temporal
dependencies within a time segment. Then, we constructed the
spatiotemporal graphs by mapping the temporal embedding
to the WTN as node attributes. (2) a spatial embedding
module, which learns the fused spatio-temporal embedding
from the spaiotemporal graphs. In addition, we developed
an integrated one-class detection method with an improved
pairwise kernel. The new kernel is capable of augmenting the
difference between normal and attack patterns via the pairwise
similarity among deep embedding vectors of system behaviors.
Finally, we conducted extensive experiments to illustrate the
effectiveness of our method: STOD achieves an accuracy of
91.65%, with average improvement ratios of 82.78% and
22.96% with respect to F1 and AUC, compared with the
baseline methods.
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